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Cooperative grey games and the grey Shapley value

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dc.creator PALANCI, Osman
dc.creator Ergun, Serap
dc.creator Weber, G. -W.
dc.creator Gok, S. Z. Alparslan
dc.date 2015-08-02T21:00:00Z
dc.date.accessioned 2020-10-06T09:26:50Z
dc.date.available 2020-10-06T09:26:50Z
dc.identifier 142de079-428d-40a4-a03d-5c1959ac9452
dc.identifier 10.1080/02331934.2014.956743
dc.identifier https://avesis.sdu.edu.tr/publication/details/142de079-428d-40a4-a03d-5c1959ac9452/oai
dc.identifier.uri http://acikerisim.sdu.edu.tr/xmlui/handle/123456789/53895
dc.description This contribution is located in the common area of operational research and economics, with a close relation and joint future potential with optimization: game theory. We focus on collaborative game theory under uncertainty. This study is on a new class of cooperative games where the set of players is finite and the coalition values are interval grey numbers. An interesting solution concept, the grey Shapley value, is introduced and characterized with the properties of additivity, efficiency, symmetry and dummy player, which are straightforward generalizations of the corresponding properties in the classical cooperative game theory. The paper ends with a conclusion and an outlook to future studies.
dc.language eng
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.title Cooperative grey games and the grey Shapley value
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article


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