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On dominance core and stable sets for cooperative ellipsoidal games

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dc.creator Weber, G. -W.
dc.creator Goek, S. Z. Alparslan
dc.date 2013-10-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.accessioned 2021-12-03T11:31:33Z
dc.date.available 2021-12-03T11:31:33Z
dc.identifier 852394d2-1a8f-43a5-8f35-67c4eadce5b0
dc.identifier 10.1080/02331934.2013.793327
dc.identifier https://avesis.sdu.edu.tr/publication/details/852394d2-1a8f-43a5-8f35-67c4eadce5b0/oai
dc.identifier.uri http://acikerisim.sdu.edu.tr/xmlui/handle/123456789/93092
dc.description The allocation problem of rewards or costs is a central question for individuals and organizations contemplating cooperation under uncertainty. The involvement of uncertainty in cooperative games is motivated by the real world where noise in observation and experimental design, incomplete information and further vagueness in preference structures and decision-making play an important role. The theory of cooperative ellipsoidal games provides a new game theoretical angle and suitable tools for answering this question. In this paper, some solution concepts using ellipsoids, namely the ellipsoidal imputation set, the ellipsoidal dominance core and the ellipsoidal stable sets for cooperative ellipsoidal games, are introduced and studied. The main results contained in the paper are the relations between the ellipsoidal core, the ellipsoidal dominance core and the ellipsoidal stable sets of such a game.
dc.language eng
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.title On dominance core and stable sets for cooperative ellipsoidal games
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article


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