<p>Standard solutions for cooperative transferable utility (TU-) games assign to every playerin a TU-game a real number representing the player’s payoff. In this paper, we introduceinterval solutions for TU-games which assign to every player in a game a payoff interval.Even when the worths of coalitions are known, it might be that the individual payoff ofa player is not known. According to an interval solution, every player knows at least alower- and upper bound for its individual payoff. Therefore, interval solutions are usefulwhen there is uncertainty about the payoff allocation even when the worths that can beearned by coalitions are known. Specifically, we consider two interval generalizations ofthe famous Shapley value that are based on marginal contributions in terms of intervals.To determine these marginal interval contributions, we apply the subtraction operator ofMoore. We provide axiomatizations for the class of totally positive TU-games. We also showhow these axiomatizations can be used to extend any linear TU-game solution to an intervalsolution. Finally, we illustrate these interval solutions by applying them to sequencing games<br></p>